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MAPPING A HIDDEN WORLD OF
INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY
COOPERATION
JEFFREY L. DUNOFF*
I
INTRODUCTION
Almost exactly one decade ago, Law and Contemporary Problems published
a highly influential symposium entitled The Emergence of Global
1
Administrative Law. The articles in that issue described rapidly changing
patterns of transnational regulation, identified an emerging “global
administrative space,” and explored normative questions raised by shifts in
authority to transnational administrative processes. At roughly the same time,
network scholars described a “new world order,” in which transnational
governance networks increasingly conducted regulatory functions across a wide
2
variety of issue areas. Both literatures introduced new conceptualizations of
trends in international cooperation and standard-setting.
This symposium’s focus on “international regulatory cooperation” revisits
themes explored in the global administrative law and networks literatures.
Broadly conceived, international regulatory cooperation consists of
arrangements to promote cooperation in the design, monitoring, and
enforcement or ex post management of regulation, with a view to supporting
the consistency of rules across national borders. The topic has returned to the
center of the diplomatic and scholarly agenda, in part as a result of the
regulatory failures that contributed to the global recession. Indeed, as this
symposium goes to press, the European Union (EU) and the United States are
engaged in EU–U.S. Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership
3
negotiations, which are focused on promoting regulatory coherence, and a
Copyright © 2015 by Jeffrey L. Dunoff.
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* Laura H. Carnell Professor, Temple University Beasley School of Law. Earlier versions of this
article were presented at a symposium entitled “New Approaches to International Regulatory
Cooperation” at NYU School of Law and at a conference entitled “Rethinking the Boundaries of
Public Law and Public Space” at the European University Institute, and I learned much from
participants at both events. In addition, I am extremely grateful to Duncan Hollis, Nikolas Rajkovic,
and Richard Stewart for thoughtful and detailed comments on earlier drafts of this article.
1. Symposium, The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3 &
4 (Summer & Autumn 2005).
2. See, e.g., ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004).
3. C. Boyden Gray, Upgrading Existing Regulatory Mechanisms for Transatlantic Regulatory
Cooperation, 78 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, 2015; Fernanda G. Nicola, The Politicization of Legal
Expertise in the TTIP Negotiation, 78 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, 2015. For a provocative view of
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lively debate has emerged over how best to implement an executive order
4
promoting international regulatory cooperation. Thus, this symposium could
not be more timely.
The contributions to this symposium substantially advance scholarly
understanding of the strategies governments use to promote more consistent
and coordinated rules. Notably, although the articles diverge on a number of
critical issues, they share a common understanding of the phenomena under
investigation. International regulatory cooperation, under this shared view,
involves domestic officials from different jurisdictions jointly addressing issues
of mutual concern. This activity is characterized as international because it
involves activities between or among officials from different states.
Despite the important insights found in these articles, the focus on
interactions among domestic regulators from different jurisdictions has the
unintended and unfortunate effect of obscuring other important forms of
international regulatory cooperation, including, specifically, regulatory
interactions among actors from different international organizations and legal
regimes. These activities, analyzed in more detail below, are “regulatory” in the
sense that they involve sustained and organized efforts to modify the behavior
of target actors to advance social or collective ends, through rules or norms and,
often, mechanisms of implementation and enforcement. Moreover, these
regulatory activities result from “interactions,” meaning they are a product of
the myriad ways that international actors and institutions engage with and react
to one another.
To be sure, international organizations also interact with firms,
nongovernmental organizations, and other civil society actors in ways that
produce novel and important forms of regulation. However, in recent years, a
large and sophisticated literature has analyzed both hybrid public–private
5
bodies and private transnational regulation. Ironically, the same amount of
scholarly attention has not been devoted to regulation resulting from
interactions involving more familiar international actors, namely international
the potential costs of regulatory cooperation and the potential benefits of regulatory variation, see
Jonathan B. Wiener & Alberto Alemanno, The Future of International Regulatory Cooperation: TTIP
as a Learning Process toward a Global Policy Laboratory, 78 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, 2015, at
122–32.
4. Exec. Order No. 13,609, 77 Fed. Reg. 26,413 (May 1, 2012). See, e.g., Reeve T. Bull,
Developing a Domestic Framework for International Regulatory Cooperation, 78 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., no. 4, 2015.
5. See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS ORCHESTRATORS (Kenneth Abbott et al.
eds., 2015); TIM BÜTHE & WALTER MATTLI, THE NEW GLOBAL RULERS: THE PRIVATIZATION OF
REGULATION IN THE WORLD ECONOMY (2011); Peer Zumbansen, Transnational Private Regulatory
Governance: Ambiguities of Public Authority and Private Power, 76 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 117
(2013). Indeed, as private and hybrid public–private regulatory efforts proliferate, scholars have even
begun to analyze their interactions with each other. See, e.g., Burkard Eberlein et al., Transnational
Business Governance Interactions: Conceptualization and Framework for Analysis, 8 REG. &
GOVERNANCE (SPECIAL ISSUE: TRANSNATIONAL BUSINESS GOVERNANCE INTERACTIONS) 1 (2014)
(analyzing implications of interactions in transnational business governance across numerous issue
areas for regulatory capacity and performance).
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organizations. The inattention to international regulatory cooperation, however,
is particularly significant for several reasons.
First, international regulatory cooperation is commonly used to address a
wide variety of issues. In areas as disparate as peacekeeping, fighting
HIV/AIDS, monitoring trade in dangerous chemicals, offering debt relief,
protecting endangered species, coordinating international criminal
enforcement, and providing humanitarian assistance, actors from different
international organizations and regimes routinely collaborate to jointly address
6
issues of common concern. As a result, the failure to attend to this activity
compromises dominant approaches to conceptualizing international regulatory
cooperation. Conversely, attention to the variety, number, and importance of
these forms of coordination, collaboration, and, at times, competition among
international bodies is essential to understanding the promise and limits of
international regulatory cooperation.
Second, the quantity and significance of these forms of international
regulatory cooperation will increase, as traditional forms of cooperation—
prominently including efforts to create general rules via multilateral treaty—are
7
seen as increasingly cumbersome and ineffective. The rapid rise of new powers
has rendered multilateral negotiations more difficult. Moreover, existing
international bodies—frequently designed in light of very different distributions
of power—are often paralyzed by dysfunctional but difficult-to-change
8
decisionmaking processes. Together, these difficulties contribute to a growing
sense that traditional legislative and regulatory mechanisms are unable to meet
9
current needs. As a result, new forms of multi-stakeholder and nontreaty
governance are emerging. The impact and reach of the nontraditional
mechanisms highlighted here will only increase over time.
Third, the emergence of new forms of international regulatory cooperation
raises challenging conceptual, doctrinal, and normative issues. As an analytic
matter, what are the drivers, mechanisms, and pathways that determine the
frequency and intensity of regulatory interactions? Under what circumstances
are interactions likely to lead to cooperative behavior, and when do they lead to
competition? How should we characterize, measure, and evaluate the outputs
and impacts of regulatory interactions? As a doctrinal matter, what rules govern
the production of legal norms through interactions among actors from different
international bodies? Are these activities subject to judicial review or to other
institutional checks and balances? Finally, as a normative matter, in what sense
6. See infra Part III.
7. See, e.g., THOMAS HALE, DAVID HELD & KEVIN YOUNG, GRIDLOCK: WHY GLOBAL
COOPERATION IS FAILING WHEN WE NEED IT MOST (2013) (arguing that treaties and other forms of
legal cooperation are increasingly inadequate).
8. See, e.g., Shawn Donnan, WTO Begins Talks to Break Deadlock Over ‘Consensus’ Principle,
FINANCIAL
TIMES,
Oct.
12,
2014,
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/a289ba90-51e7-11e4-b55e00144feab7de.html#axzz3SgXZoD00 (detailing efforts to circumvent the founding principle that all
decisions are made by consensus in light of ongoing negotiation deadlock).
9. HALE, HELD & YOUNG, supra note 7.
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are norms produced by international bureaucrats legitimate? To whom are
actors in different international organizations accountable? What role do power
and inequality play in determining whether and how international regulatory
10
cooperation takes place?
Fourth, international regulatory cooperation has not been systematically
11
explored in the scholarly literature. For example, although network theorists
have illuminated the informal arrangements created when regulatory officials
cooperate with counterparts in other jurisdictions, to date, they have not
addressed the network-style interactions that take place among officials from
12
different international bodies. Although some global administrative law
13
writings usefully address interactions among international organizations, this
literature rarely, if ever, foregrounds the dynamic, ongoing, relational
regulatory interactions detailed below. And, although the literature on regime
complexes helpfully describes the institutionally dense environment within
14
which international organizations exist, it has not developed an analytic
typology to clarify the various types of interactions that take place. As a result,
scholars know little about these actions and their role in contemporary global
governance.
This article seeks to extend the existing literature, provide greater analytical
traction to the study of international regulatory cooperation than existing
approaches do, and advance understandings of how, why, and when
international regulatory cooperation occurs. To do so, this article maps the
various ways international organizations cooperate, collaborate, and at times,
compete in the design, interpretation, and implementation of international
rules, regulations, standards, and guidelines. The analysis proceeds in three
parts, followed by a brief conclusion.
10. Of course, similar questions can be asked of the transnational regulatory efforts explored
elsewhere in this issue. However, these questions are even more pressing regarding the forms of
cooperation highlighted here. The actors and institutions in the processes described below lack the legal
and political controls that apply to parallel domestic processes, and the norms they produce lack the
foundation in state consent that more traditional forms of international regulatory cooperation possess.
11. Rare exceptions that adopt broader perspectives on interactions among international bodies
similar to those developed here include INSTITUTIONAL INTERACTION IN GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL
GOVERNANCE: SYNERGY AND CONFLICT AMONG INTERNATIONAL AND EU POLICIES (Sebastian
Oberthür & Thomas Gehring eds., 2006); MARGARET A. YOUNG, TRADING FISH, SAVING FISH: THE
INTERACTION BETWEEN REGIMES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2011); Claire R. Kelly, Institutional
Alliances and Derivative Legitimacy, 29 MICH. J. INT’L L. 605 (2008).
12. Abraham L. Newman & David Zaring, Regulatory Networks: Power, Legitimacy, and
Compliance, in INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS: THE STATE OF THE ART 244 (Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Mark A. Pollack eds., 2013) (reviewing
scholarship on regulatory networks).
13. See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart & Michelle Ratton Sanchez Badin, The World Trade
Organization and Global Administrative Law, in CONSTITUTIONALISM, MULTILEVEL TRADE
GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 457 (Christian Joerges & Ernst-Ulrich
Petersmann eds., 2011).
14. See, e.g., Kal Raustiala, Institutional Proliferation and the International Legal Order, in
INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS:
THE STATE OF THE ART 293 (Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Mark A. Pollack eds., 2013).
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Part II provides a very short overview of the structural factors that give rise
to interactions among international organizations. The article briefly describes a
decentralized and fragmented international order consisting of multiple
international legal regimes with functional, and at times overlapping,
responsibilities. This material will be familiar to many readers, but it provides a
necessary background and context for the analysis that follows.
Part III, the heart of the article, develops a preliminary typology of the
various ways actors from different international organizations engage in
regulatory cooperation. In particular, the article identifies two different axes to
categorize these interactions. One axis focuses on the various forms interactions
can take, which centers on the activity or function being coordinated. The
second axis focuses on the nature of the interaction, which spans a continuum
from rationalization of parallel or overlapping efforts, to expansions of powers
or jurisdiction, to competitive and conflictual interactions. Considered together,
these axes can be conceptualized as a three-by-three matrix that captures much
of the universe of international regulatory cooperation.
The purpose of illuminating and mapping this world of international
regulatory cooperation is not simply to clarify systematically the different
modes of interaction. Just as importantly, it is intended to open up a fruitful
new research agenda for those who wish to understand and critique this activity.
Thus, part IV, identifies some of the positive and normative issues raised by
international regulatory cooperation. As a positive matter, future studies can do
much to identify patterns in international organization interactions, including
the factors that contribute to successful or unsuccessful international regulatory
outcomes and whether they differ across different issue areas. Future research
should also explore normative concerns raised by international regulatory
cooperation, including issues of accountability and legitimacy, as well as the role
of power in shaping the frequency and content of international regulatory
cooperation.
II
STRUCTURAL FACTORS BEHIND INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY
COOPERATION: INSTITUTIONAL PROLIFERATION AND OVERLAP
International regulatory cooperation takes place within the context of an
international legal order that took shape during the remarkable period of
treaty-drafting and institution-building following the end of World War II.
These postwar efforts clustered, broadly, around three different domains—
security and warfare, human rights, and international economic relations. In the
area of security and armed conflict, states created the United Nations in the
15
summer of 1945, crystallizing in law the modern rules governing the use of
force and, shortly thereafter, the four Geneva Conventions on the law of armed
16
17
conflict. The UN Charter’s skeletal human rights provisions marked the start
15. See U.N. Charter.
16. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
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of what has evolved into an institutionally dense human rights system. In 1948,
the UN General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of Human
18
Rights, which in turn led to the covenants on civil and political rights and on
economic and social rights; a series of regional human rights agreements; and
treaties addressing specific human rights concerns such as genocide, torture,
19
and gender discrimination. Developments in the economic field were equally
substantial: the 1944 Bretton Woods Agreements created the World Bank and
the International Monetary Fund. In 1948, an agreement was reached on the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the precursor to today’s
World Trade Organization (WTO), which oversees some $23 trillion in
international trade in goods and services per year.
As this thumbnail account suggests, during the postwar era, international
cooperation has increasingly been structured within the framework of
international organizations. Today, hundreds of these bodies—
intergovernmental entities established by treaty and governed by international
law—populate the international landscape, addressing aviation, commerce,
culture, development, environment, intellectual property, investment, oceans,
trade, and virtually every other field of human endeavor. This institutional
order can claim many important successes. Although the UN obviously has not
eliminated global conflict, it has facilitated the settlement of many regional
conflicts, played a central role in the decolonization process, and greatly
elevated the prominence of human rights in international legal and political
discourse. The GATT−WTO and Bretton Woods institutions spearheaded an
enormous expansion of the global economy that helped to lift millions out of
poverty; the World Health Organization (WHO) was instrumental in virtually
eliminating polio and smallpox and reducing infant mortality; and the Office of
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has assisted
over thirty million refugees fleeing war, persecution, and famine. Additionally,
technically oriented bodies, like the International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO) and the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), help make
the conveniences of modern life possible. Overall, it is fair to conclude that
“these special-purpose global bodies . . . make vast contributions to aggregate

Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of
the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949,
6 U.S.T. 3217; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3316; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug.
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516.
17. See U.N. Charter pmbl. (recognizing “fundamental human rights” and the “dignity and worth
of the human person”); id. at art. 1, para. 3 (declaring one of the purposes of the charter is to
“promot[e] and encourag[e] respect for human rights”).
18. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc A/RES/217(III)
(Dec. 10, 1948).
19. See, e.g., Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, Dec. 10 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85; Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13; Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277.
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human welfare and promote important moral concerns in fields such as human
20
rights and environmental protection.”
At the same time, the proliferation of organizations is potentially
problematic. International organizations and regimes are typically created in
response to specific problems and hence have been formed at different times by
different actors for different purposes. Thus, each international organization
comes with its own constitutive text, legal rules and principles, subsidiary
bodies, and expertise, all designed to pursue specific tasks and advance certain
values. These bodies operate in a highly decentralized and largely
nonhierarchical environment. Activities and decisions in one regime are often
taken with little knowledge of or regard for decisions in neighboring regimes,
and there are few formal rules to govern their relations or mechanisms to
promote accountability or coordination.
To be sure, many domestic legal systems contain large numbers of
specialized administrative and regulatory bodies. These bodies, however, are
typically subject to compulsory judicial review as well as legislative and
executive oversight that can prioritize objectives, coordinate activities, and
resolve conflicts. These authorities and mechanisms are largely lacking on the
21
global level.
In the highly fragmented international legal order, two or more
international bodies or legal regimes frequently purport to govern the same
individuals, activities, or policy domains. For example, at least a half-dozen
international bodies currently address international financial issues, no less than
ten international bodies claim regulatory authority over Internet infrastructure,
22
and roughly two dozen international bodies address climate change. Moreover,
although recourse to courts is still considerably less common on the
international plane than the domestic, the proliferation of international
tribunals means it is increasingly possible for the same dispute to be considered
by multiple courts that use different procedures and apply different law. In this
densely populated international legal landscape, global and regional regulatory
bodies continuously interact in complex patterns of regulatory cooperation and
competition.
III
A TYPOLOGY OF INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY COOPERATION
This part begins the task of mapping the complex terrain of international
regulatory cooperation. For expository purposes it is useful to distinguish
between two different axes. One highlights the form of the interaction, focusing
20. Richard B. Stewart, Remedying Disregard in Global Regulatory Governance: Accountability,
Participation, and Responsiveness, 108 AM. J. INT’L L. 211, 214 (2014).
21. Id. at 218.
22. See Vint Cerf et al., Internet Governance is Our Shared Responsibility, 10 J. L. & POL’Y INFO.
SOC. 1 (2014) (discussing the international efforts to regulate the internet); Robert O. Keohane &
David G. Victor, The Regime Complex for Climate Change, 9 PERSP. ON POL. 7 (2011) (describing the
international regulatory regime for global climate change efforts).
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on the activity or function being coordinated. A second axis highlights the
nature of the interaction, which covers a continuum from rationalization of
overlapping efforts, to expansions of jurisdiction, to competitive and conflictual
interactions. This is by no means intended as an exhaustive list or the only way
to conceptualize the interactions resulting in regulatory cooperation. Nor
should the categories be understood as mutually exclusive, as interactions often
migrate from one form to another (that is, operational interactions produce
regulatory interactions) or reflect mixed motives (because international
organizations often simultaneously cooperate and compete). The categories are
a useful heuristic device to organize a wide array of international practice and
help render visible the under-studied phenomena of global regulatory
cooperation.
A. Forms of International Regulatory Cooperation
Many interactions produce new regulatory norms and instruments.
Sometimes, actors from different international organizations interact with the
express intention of generating new standards; this article labels these
“regulatory interactions.” Other times, actors from multiple bodies interact on
operational issues, with new regulatory norms as an incidental byproduct of
these “operational interactions.” And sometimes, actors from different bodies
engage in “conceptual interactions,” which are not themselves intended directly
to produce regulatory outcomes but instead to lay the analytic and conceptual
underpinnings for future regulatory efforts.
1. Regulatory Interactions: Creating and Navigating Shared Regulatory
Space
Across a wide variety of policy domains, actors from multiple international
bodies systematically interact with each other to navigate or create shared
regulatory space. In so doing, they regularly and continuously generate new
international legal rules, regulations, standards, and guidelines.
a. Interactions to address coordination problems. Perhaps the most common
and most straightforward form of international regulatory cooperation occurs
when two or more international bodies jointly produce legal norms and other
regulatory instruments. This is a particularly attractive means to solve
coordination problems, such as when mutual gains are available when parties
coalesce around common positions.
Consider, for example, international efforts to control environmentally
hazardous substances and activities. In the 1980s and 1990s, a number of
uncoordinated efforts to classify and label dangerous chemicals emerged,
including an International Labour Organization (ILO) Convention, an
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
Chemicals Programme, a Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)
recommendation on pesticides, UN recommendations, and various EU
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23

directives. This fragmented approach proved unsatisfactory and, in 1992, states
formally recognized the need for “a globally harmonized hazard classification
24
system and compatible labelling system.” To advance this goal, in 1995, the
WHO, the OECD, the FAO, the ILO, the United Nations Environment
Programme (UNEP), and the United Nations Industrial Development
Organization (UNIDO) jointly formed the Inter-Organization for the Sound
25
Management of Chemicals (IOMC). Among other responsibilities, the IOMC
26
was charged with developing a harmonized classification and labelling system.
To do so, different tasks were allocated to different agencies. For example, the
IOMC designated the OECD as the lead agency for the harmonization of
classification criteria for health and environmental hazards, a UN SubCommittee of Experts on the Transport of Dangerous Goods served as the
focal point for work on physical hazards, and the ILO managed work on the
harmonization of chemical-hazard communication. An IOMC coordinating and
drafting group, including members of all IOMC agencies, oversaw these various
efforts. Once the IOMC group combined and harmonized the various efforts
into one comprehensive document, it was submitted to the UN for global
implementation as the “Globally Harmonized System for the Classification and
Labelling of Chemicals” (GHS). The GHS was first published in 2003, with
27
revisions in 2005 and 2007. Although the GHS is extremely ambitious—it
covers all chemicals—it has been implemented, in whole or in part, by
28
approximately sixty-seven states, including the United States and the EU.

23. See, e.g., ILO, Convention Concerning Safety in the Use of Chemicals at Work, No. C170
(June 25, 1990); OECD, Decision-Recommendation of the Council on the Systematic Investigation of
Existing Chemicals, C(87)90/Final (June 26, 1987); FAO, Revised Guidelines on Environmental Criteria
for the Registration of Pesticides (1989); European Econ. Cmty., On the Evaluation and Control of the
Risks of Existing Substances, Council Regulation No. 793/93, Off. J. Eur. Comm. L. 84 (Mar. 23, 1993).
24. UN Conference on Environment & Development, Rio de Janeiro, Braz., June 3–14, 1992,
Agenda 21, ¶ 19.27.
25. FAO-ILO-OECD-UNEP-UNIDO-WHO: Memorandum of Understanding Concerning
Establishment of the Inter-Organization Programme for the Sound Management of Chemicals, Mar.
13, 1995, 34 I.L.M. 1311.
26. IOMC, Coordinating Group for the Harmonization of Chemical Classification Systems, Revised
Terms of Reference and Work Program, at Annex 1, ¶¶ 7–8, Doc. IOMC/HCS/95 (Jan. 14, 1996).
27. U.N. ECON. COMM’N FOR EUR. GLOBALLY HARMONIZED SYSTEM OF CLASSIFICATION AND
LABELLING OF CHEMICALS, U.N. Doc. ST/SG/AC.10/30, U.N. Sales No. E.03.II.E.25 (Aug. 2003);
U.N. ECON. COMM’N FOR EUR. GLOBALLY HARMONIZED SYSTEM OF CLASSIFICATION AND
LABELLING OF CHEMICALS (GHS), U.N. Doc. ST/SG/AC.10/30/Rev.4, U.N. Sales No. E.11.II.E.6
(2011); U.N. ECON. COMM’N FOR EUR. GLOBALLY HARMONIZED SYSTEM OF CLASSIFICATION AND
LABELLING OF CHEMICALS (GHS) U.N. Doc. ST/SG/AC.10/30/Rev.5, U.N. Sales No. E.13.II.E.1
(2013).
28. In February 2006, IMOC, UNEP, and the Intergovernmental Forum on Chemical Safety
(IFCS) convened the International Conference on Chemicals Management. The Global Environment
Facility, the United Nations Development Programme, and the World Bank joined the coconvenors in
adopting a Strategic Approach to International Chemicals management (SAICM). This initiative is
designed to “strengthen the coherence and [the] synergies that exist” between existing efforts to
manage dangerous chemicals and to address “existing gaps in the framework of international chemicals
policy.” See UNEP, Strategic Approach to International Chemicals Management: Dubai Declaration
on International Chemicals Management (2006), http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/templates/agphome/
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Similar efforts by actors from different international organizations to jointly
navigate shared regulatory space are found in other issue areas. For example,
the ICAO, which sets standards for aviation safety, and the ITU, which
allocates global radio spectrum and satellite orbits, have collaborated on issues
of mutual concern, including standards to avoid interference with aeronautical
communication and navigation systems. These two organizations recently
started to work on regulatory issues raised by civilian automated pilotless
29
aircraft, or drones.
Note that in both examples of regulatory cooperation the regulatory
interactions were initiated by the organizations themselves. In other cases,
interactions are “rule-based” in the sense that a treaty or other legal instrument
requires actors from one body to consult with another body whose mission is
implicated in the first body’s decisionmaking. This article examines below
examples of such “rule-based” interactions.
b. Interactions to address collective action problems. Many collective action
problems are considerably more difficult to solve than the coordination
problems mentioned above. In these cases, states often face mixed motives, and
cooperation is therefore harder to maintain. Protecting endangered marine
species is an example of a collective action problem, and the interactions
between the FAO and the Convention on International Trade in Endangered
Species (CITES) Secretariat provide an example of how international
regulatory cooperation can address such problems.
The FAO seeks to eradicate hunger and food insecurity and promote
sustainable agriculture. In 1995, the FAO produced a Code of Conduct for
Responsible Fisheries to address concerns over fisheries management.
Implementation of FAO norms, however, has historically been weak, and, over
time, pressures grew to address endangered marine species through other
mechanisms, including CITES.
30
In 2002, several marine species were added to CITES listings. However,
the decision was controversial, given questions about the scope of CITES’s
jurisdiction over marine species, its expertise, a supposed bias in favor of
conservation and against economic development, and concerns over creating
31
conflicts with FAO norms. CITES includes a provision requiring, in
connection with proposals to list marine species, consultation with “inter32
governmental bodies having a function in relation to those species,” and the
documents/Pests_Pesticides/Code/SAICMdeclaration.pdf.
29. See, e.g., ICAO, Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS), Cir 328 AN/190 (2011) (noting
consultations between agencies).
30. See, e.g., Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora,
Amendments
to
Appendices
I
and
II
of
the
Convention,
Nov.
15,
2002,
http://www.cites.org/sites/default/files/eng/cop/12/Adopted_Amendments.pdf.
31. Margaret A. Young, Protecting Endangered Marine Species: Collaboration Between the Food
and Agriculture Organization and the CITES Regime, 11 MELB. J. INT’L L. 441, 452–59 (2010).
32. Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, art.
XV(2)(b), March 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087.
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FAO Code of Conduct encourages states to cooperate in complying with
33
treaties that regulate the trade of endangered species. Despite significant
disagreement among FAO members regarding the appropriate relationship
between FAO and CITES, the two secretariats attempted to formalize their
interactions, including through lengthy and contentious negotiations over a
34
memorandum of understanding. These negotiations eventually produced such
a memorandum providing that CITES is to notify the FAO whenever it
35
considers listing a marine species. The FAO is thereafter to carry out a
scientific review of the proposal in accordance with CITES biological listing
36
criteria, taking account of any recommendations CITES submits to the FAO.
After receiving the FAO review, the memorandum of understanding requires
the CITES Secretariat to “respect, to the greatest extent possible, the results of
the FAO [review]” when communicating its recommendations to CITES
37
parties.
The consultation process has proved highly influential. For example, in
2007, Germany proposed the listing of two shark species. The CITES
Secretariat notified the FAO, and an FAO expert panel concluded that the
38
available scientific evidence did not support the proposed listing. The CITES
39
parties did not approve the German proposals. In 2013, several proposals to
40
list various marine species were submitted to CITES. FAO expert panels
recommended some of these proposals be adopted, including the shark species
41
rejected in 2007, and others rejected. In each case, the CITES parties followed
the FAO’s recommendations. Thereafter, the CITES Secretariat and the FAO
developed a joint plan of action regarding listed species, and delegations from
the two bodies have begun to collaborate on the implementation of shark
protection projects.
33. FAO,
Code
of
Conduct
for
Responsible
Fisheries,
at
art.
11.2.9,
http://www.fao.org/docrep/005/v9878e/v9878e00.htm#11 (Oct. 31, 1995).
34. For a detailed account of FAO–CITES negotiations, see Young, supra note 31, at 464–73.
35. See id., at 484 (describing the memorandum of understanding’s process for altering the listing
of species).
36. Id.
37. FAO & CITES, Memorandum of Understanding Between the Food and Agriculture
Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the Secretariat of the Convention on International Trade
in Endangered Species, at para. 6 [hereinafter FAO–CITES MOU], http://www.cites.org/sites/
default/files/eng/disc/sec/FAO-CITES-e.pdf.
38. See FAO, Fisheries Report No. 833: Report of the Second FAO Ad Hoc Expert Advisory
Panel for the Assessment of Proposals to Amend Appendices I and II of CITES concerning
Commercially-Exploited Aquatic Species, at 19–28, FIMF/R833 (Mar. 2007) (stating the proposal of
the porbeagle shark was not supported by available evidence); id. at 37–49 (stating the proposal of the
spiny dogfish was not supported by available evidence).
39. INT’L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., Summary of the Fourteenth Conference of the Parties to
the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora: 3–15 June 2007,
21 EARTH NEGOTIATIONS BULLETIN (No. 61) 1, 16 (2007).
40. See, e.g., INT’L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., Summary of the Sixteenth Meeting of the
Conference of the Parties to the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna
and Flora: 3–14 March 2013, 21 EARTH NEGOTIATIONS BULLETIN (No. 83) 1, 23 (2013).
41. Id.
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Significantly, the CITES Secretariat is not required to accept the
conclusions of the FAO review. Although the consultation requirement does
not dictate outcomes, it de facto obliges the CITES Secretariat to engage
seriously with the FAO’s views and develop a persuasive rationale for pursuing
an alternative course of action. In practice, CITES listing decisions have largely
followed the FAO recommendations.
c. Interactions to address distribution problems. Distribution problems pose
particularly difficult problems for international law. Given a lack of
enforcement mechanisms and a general inability to tax and redistribute
resources, issues with strong distributional features often require other
mechanisms—such as side payments—or otherwise resist solution. Such is the
case, for example, with current efforts to craft a climate-change treaty. Perhaps
not surprisingly, interactions to address distributional problems have met mixed
success.
Developments under the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic
Pollutants (POPs Convention), which bans the use of certain pesticides and
chemicals, provides a useful illustration of interactions regarding issues with
strong distributional elements. Perhaps the most controversial issue during the
POPs negotiations was whether to ban use of the pesticide DDT. A coalition of
environmental groups advocated for a ban, emphasizing the chemical’s
42
potential health effects, including reduced fertility, birth defects, and cancer.
On the other hand, many developing states, supported by the WHO (a formal
participant in the negotiations), argued DDT was highly effective in controlling
43
the spread of malaria and that no economically feasible alternative existed. In
effect, the environmental benefits of a ban would impose significant public
health costs upon developing states. The WHO position ultimately prevailed,
and the POPs Convention restricts, but does not ban, the continued use of
44
DDT.
The treaty negotiators contemplated that the list of covered substances
45
would change over time. In particular, the POPs Convention expressly
42. See, e.g., Kathleen R. Walker, et al., Developing an International Consensus on DDT: A
Balance of Environmental Protection and Disease Control, 206 INT’L J. HYG. ENVIRON. HEALTH 423
(2003); Erin Perkins, The Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants: A Step Toward the
Vision of Rachel Carson, 2001 COLO. J. INT’L ENV. L. & POL’Y 191 (2001); Sheryl Gay Stolberg, DDT,
Target of Global Ban, Finds Defenders in Experts on Malaria, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 1999,
http://www.nytimes.com/1999/08/29/world/ddt-target-of-global-ban-finds-defenders-in-experts-onmalaria.html.
43. See, e.g., INT’L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., The Second Session of the International
Negotiating Committee for an International Legally Binding Instrument for Implementing International
Action on Certain Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPS): 25–29 January 1999, 15 EARTH
NEGOTIATIONS BULLETIN (No. 18) 1 (1999) at 2, 4, 9; INT’L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., Report on
the First Session of the INC for an International Legally Binding Instrument for Implementing
International Action on Certain Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPS): 29 June–3 July 1998, 15 EARTH
NEGOTIATIONS BULLETIN (No. 10) 1 (1998), at 6.
44. Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, Annex B, pt. I, May 22, 2001, 40
I.L.M. 532 (entered into force May 17, 2004).
45. See id., at art. 8 (detailing process for listing new chemicals), art. 16 (detailing process for
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provides that at least every three years the treaty parties “shall, in consultation
with the [WHO], evaluate the continued need for DDT for disease vector
46
control.” The clear expectation is that if and when the WHO determines that
DDT is no longer needed for malaria control, the treaty will be amended to ban
DDT. Thus, the treaty explicitly structures an ongoing series of interactions
between the POPs Secretariat and the WHO over global efforts to regulate
DDT.
The POPs Convention also illustrates a much more common form of
regulatory cooperation; namely, when treaties expressly incorporate by
reference standards created by another international body. Although the treaty
does not ban use of DDT, it provides that parties may produce and use DDT
47
only in accordance with WHO recommendations and guidelines. Thus any
changes in WHO guidelines expanding or restricting rules for DDT use
automatically produce changes in the permissible uses of DDT for purposes of
the POPs Convention. This approach has the effect of generating parallel rules
in the chemicals and public health regimes, producing harmonized approaches
to the issue.
Distributional issues are likewise central to many efforts to regulate
employment and workplace safety, in which the interests of workers are often in
tension with those of their employers. For example, issues involving seafarers
have given rise to much interaction between the International Maritime
Organization (IMO) and the ILO, perhaps in part because of unclear and
overlapping jurisdictions. The IMO is responsible for the safety and security of
shipping and the prevention of marine pollution by ships. The ILO promotes
and realizes international standards related to employment. The two
organizations have collaborated to establish a series of joint working groups and
expert groups on issues involving seafarers. These groups produced a variety of
48
guidelines, which by their terms are not legally binding. Nevertheless, in
practice, they strongly influence domestic legislation and demonstrate how
international regulatory cooperation can address international problems with
strong distributional implications.
evaluating effectiveness of treaty).
46. Id. at Annex B, Part II, para. 6.
47. Id. at Annex B, Part II, para. 2.
48. For a sampling, see IMO & ILO, Code of Practice on Security in Ports, MESSHP/2003/14
(2003),
http://www.imo.org/OurWork/Security/Instruments/Documents/ILOIMOCodeOfPractice
English.pdf; IMO, Guidelines on Provision of Financial Security in Case of Abandonment of Seafarers,
A 22/Res.930 (Dec. 17, 2001) (adopted Nov. 29, 2001), http:// http://www.imo.org/blast/blastDataHelper
.asp?data_id= 24584& filename=A930(22).pdf; IMO, Guidelines on Shipowners’ Responsibilities in
Respect to Contractual Claims for Personal Injury to or Death of Seafarers, A 22/Res.931 (Dec. 17,
2001) (adopted Nov. 29, 2001), http://www.imo.org/blast/blastDataHelper.asp?data_id=24557&filenam
e=A931(22).pdf; IMO & ILO, Adoption of Guidelines on Fair Treatment of Seafarers in the Event of a
Maritime
Accident,
Res.
LEG.3(91),
http://www.imo.org/OurWork/Legal/JointIMOILO
WorkingGroups OnSeafarerIssues/Documents/LEG3(91).pdf (adopted by the IMO Legal Committee
in April 2006 and the ILO Governing Body in June 2006); IMO & ILO, Guidelines on the Medical
Examinations of Seafarers (Sept. 30, 2011), http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/@ed_dialogue
/@sector/documents/normativeinstrument/wcms_174794.pdf.
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Other times, interactions on issues with strong distributional considerations
have proven less productive. For example, overfishing threatens many of the
world’s fisheries, and fisheries subsidies are increasingly seen as promoting
overfishing. As a result, the WTO, CITES, the United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the FAO, and regional fisheries organizations,
along with numerous other actors, have engaged in intensive interactions over
49
WTO negotiating texts on fisheries subsidies. These negotiations, however,
have largely stalled. Still other times, issues with strong distributional
consequences generate conflict between international bodies, as explained more
fully in the discussion below of efforts to regulate ship recycling.
Numerous other examples could be offered, but the general point should be
clear. Across numerous areas of law and policy, collaborative efforts by officials
from different international organizations and bodies constitute an important, if
underappreciated, form of international regulatory cooperation.
2. Operational Interactions
International organizations undertake a wide variety of operational
activities, including high-visibility efforts involving issues of high political
salience. For example, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical
Weapons (OPCW) is currently overseeing and verifying the destruction of
chemical weapons in Syria. Less well publicized is that simultaneously, a wide
variety of international organizations—including the International Organization
for Migration (IOM), the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the UNHCR,
the World Food Program (WFP), and the WHO—are partnering to provide
humanitarian assistance in Syria. The example is illustrative; studies of
operational activities typically focus on a single body and, to date, have not
explored how actors from different international bodies interact in the course of
50
operational activities.
A handful of examples from an array of issue areas provide a sense of the
scale and range of these operational activities. In the public health field,
perhaps the best known example is the Joint United Nations Programme on
HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), a joint venture involving ten cosponsors from a broad
spectrum of international agencies, including UNHCR, UNICEF, the WFP,
UNDP, the United Nations Population Fund (UNPF), the United Nations
Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the ILO, UNESCO, the WHO, and the
World Bank. Although each organization had developed its own AIDS
program, donor states pressed to consolidate all of these activities under a

49. See Olay Schram Stokke & Clare Coffey, Institutional Interplay and Responsible Fisheries:
Combatting Subsidies, Developing Precaution, in INSTITUTIONAL INTERACTION IN GLOBAL
ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 11, at 127 (discussing institutional interactions).
50. See, e.g., UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS: AD HOC MISSIONS, PERMANENT
ENGAGEMENT (Ramesh Thakur & Albrecht Schnabel, eds. 2001).
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single, new international organization to minimize duplication and maximize
the impact of finite resources. Officials at the existing institutions balked,
triggering “an intricate power struggle between wealthy donor states and the
51
international bureaucrats.” Perhaps surprisingly, the bureaucrats largely
prevailed. Through UNAIDS, the agencies with existing programs entered into
52
both a partnership and an agreed-upon “division of labour.” Through its
partners, UNAIDS oversees and coordinates a wide variety of operational
activities, ranging from the distribution of AIDS medications to programs to
eliminate HIV infections in newborns.
Similar collaborations are found in virtually every issue area. In the
environmental domain, the Collaborative Partnership on Forests is an informal
arrangement among fourteen international organizations with substantial
53
programs on forests that collaborate to streamline and coordinate their work.
Another example is the Global Environment Facility, which was formed as a
partnership among UNDP, UNEP, and the World Bank and was designed to
capitalize on the expertise and comparative advantages of each agency. In the
trade area, the WTO has joined with the United Nations Conference on Trade
and Development (UNCTAD), the OECD, the International Trade Center
(ITC) and a half-dozen other international bodies to assist WTO members in
implementing their commitments under the recent Trade Facilitation
Agreement. In addition, the WTO has partnered with the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), the ITC, UNCTAD, UNDP, and the World Bank to
create the Enhanced Integrated Framework, which assists least-developed
states to build trade capacity. In international criminal enforcement, the Green
Customs Initiative brings together the secretariats of six multilateral
environmental treaties with officials from Interpol, the OPCW, UNEP,
UNODC, and the World Customs Organization (WCO) to jointly enhance the
ability of domestic officials to detect and prevent illegal trade in products
covered by relevant environmental agreements. In the area of international
finance, the World Bank, the IMF, and other international financial institutions
have partnered to reduce debt burdens of developing states through the Heavily
54
Indebted Poor Countries Initiative and the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative.

51. Tana Johnson & Johannes Urpelainen, International Bureaucrats and the Formation of
Intergovernmental Organizations, 68 INT’L ORG. 177, 192 (2014).
52. UNAIDS, Summary Division of Labour Guidance Note 2010, http://www.unaids.org/sites/
default/files/en/media/unaids/contentassets/documents/document/2011/20110304_DoL_GuidanceNote_
Summary_en.pdf.
53. Members include the Center for International Forestry Research, the Secretariat of the
Convention on Biological Diversity, the FAO, the Global Environment Facility, the International
Tropical Timber Organization, the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN), the
Secretariat of the Convention to Combat Desertification, UNDP, UNEP, the United Nations Forum on
Forests, the Secretariat of the Framework Convention on Climate Change, the World Agroforestry
Centre, and the World Bank.
54. See generally IMF, Factsheet: Debt Relief Under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC)
Initiative (Sept. 30, 2014), https://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/hipc.htm; IMF, Factsheet: The
Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (Sept. 30, 2014), https://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/mdri.htm.
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Operational interactions even occur in the security domain. For example, in
2008, an African Union peacekeeping mission in Sudan was replaced by a joint
African Union–United Nations Hybrid mission in Darfur, which is currently the
55
largest peacekeeping mission in the world. These forces protect civilians,
provide security for humanitarian assistance, and monitor and verify the
implementation of agreements. Their mandate has been extended on several
occasions.
In short, inter-regime operational partnerships are increasingly common
across a range of issues. However, apart from a handful of well-known
examples, like UNAIDS, these initiatives constitute sites of international
governance that are hidden in plain sight, and whose significance has been
understudied and undertheorized. Several aspects of these interactions are of
particular interest.
56
First, operational interactions frequently generate normative standards.
Consider, by way of example, UNAIDS. When it was founded, the different
partner agencies had different procurement policies. Some, like UNICEF,
emphasized supplier compliance with the Convention on the Rights of the
Child; others, like UNHCR, had certain preferences for local suppliers; and
virtually all employed different rules depending on the size of the purchase.
Collaboration among the agencies required extensive negotiations to
coordinate the standards applicable to procurement. Similarly, the cosponsoring
agencies all had their own policies regarding integrity in the use of funds and
eventually negotiated and adopted a common “zero tolerance” approach to
57
corruption in the use of financial resources.
Notably, many operational interactions involve efforts to implement and
enforce international norms—efforts that, in turn, often lead to new norms. The
ongoing interactions between the WCO and several multilateral environmental
agreements illustrate this dynamic. The WCO developed and updates the
Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System (HS). The HS
comprises over 5,200 commodity groups, each identified by a six-digit code.
Virtually every state uses the HS “as a basis for their [c]ustoms tariffs and for
58
the collection of international trade statistics.”
The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer
(Montreal Protocol), controls production and trade in ozone-depleting
55. For the resolution authorizing this mission, see generally S.C. Res. 1769 (July 31, 2007),
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1769%282007%29.
56. See Ian Johnstone, Law-Making Through the Operational Activities of International
Organizations, 40 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 87 (2008) (providing an analysis of how operational
activities by a single international organization can generate normative standards). The dynamics
Johnstone identifies are only heightened when actors from multiple regimes collaborate.
57. Press Release, UNAIDS, UNAIDS Supports the Global Fund in Efforts to Ensure Countries
Reach Their Universal Access Goals Towards HIV Prevention, Treatment, Care and Support (Feb. 4,
2011), http://www.unaids.org/en/resources/presscentre/pressreleaseandstatementarchive/2011/february/
20110204psgfatm.
58. WCO, What is the Harmonized System (HS)?, http://www.wcoomd.org/en/topics/
nomenclature/overview/what-is-the-harmonized-system.aspx (last visited Dec. 23, 2014).
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59

substances. Because many developing states do not produce ozone-depleting
substances, the success of the treaty turns largely on efforts by customs officials
to monitor their lawful, and control their unlawful, trade. When the Montreal
Protocol came into force, however, the collection of import and export data
proved to be difficult, particularly for many developing states, because the HS
combined ozone-depleting substances and non-ozone-depleting substances in a
single category.
At the request of the Montreal Protocol parties, UNEP’s Executive
Director asked the WCO to create separate HS codes for ozone-depleting
60
substances controlled by the Montreal Protocol. Initially, the WCO resisted on
61
the grounds that trade in these substances would soon be phased out.
62
Eventually, however, the WCO created new codes, which greatly facilitated
enforcement of the Montreal Protocol. In contrast, the WCO rejected a
subsequent UNEP request to create HS codes for substances newly controlled
by the Montreal Protocol on the grounds that the trade impact was too slight to
63
warrant separate classification. As a compromise, the WCO recommended
64
that states amend their customs codes along the lines requested by UNEP.
After further communications from UNEP, the WCO Secretariat decided to
revise—and strengthen—the WCO recommendation. This example
demonstrates how interactions motivated by enforcement concerns—here,
enforcement of Montreal Protocol rules—can lead to the production of new
65
international norms.
3. Conceptual Interactions
The most intriguing interactions are conceptual. International bodies do not
simply produce rules and standards; they also create knowledge. They do so by,
for example, “defin[ing] shared international tasks (like ‘development’),
creat[ing] and defin[ing] new categories of actors (like ‘refugee’), creat[ing] new
59. UNEP, HANDBOOK FOR THE MONTREAL PROTOCOL ON SUBSTANCES THAT DEPLETE THE
OZONE LAYER (9th ed., 2012), http://ozone.unep.org/Publications/MP_Handbook/MP-Handbook2012.pdf.
60. STEPHEN O. ANDERSEN & K. MADHAVA SARMA, PROTECTING THE OZONE LAYER: THE
UNITED NATIONS HISTORY 277 (Lani Sinclair ed., 2002). See generally U.N. Secretariat, Comm. of
Experts on the Transp. of Dangerous Goods and on the Globally Harmonized Sys. of Classification and
Labelling of Chemicals, Subcomm. of Experts on Globally Harmonized Sys. of Classification and
Labelling of Chemicals, Cooperation with Other International Organizations, ST/SG/AC.10/C.4/2003/3
(May 2, 2003) (reviewing history or interactions between Montreal Protocol and WCO).
61. UNEP, Report of the Workshop on Codes, Contraband and Cooperation: Working with
Customs Authorities to Implement Environmental Treaties, ¶ 20, UNEP/(DEC)/WCO/GVA/3 (June 29,
2001).
62. Andersen & Sarma, supra note 60, at 277.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Similar developments have taken place with respect to other MEAs. For example, upon
request of the CITES Secretariat, the WCO Council has approved the amendment of tariff headings for
some live animals, meat, and skins controlled by CITES. Similarly, upon request, the HS has also been
amended from time to time to reflect new subheadings for specific chemicals controlled under the
Rotterdam Convention and for specific categories of waste controlled by the Basel Convention.
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interests for actors (like ‘promoting human rights’), and transfer[ing] models of
66
organization around the world (like markets and democracy).”
Scholarship exploring these issues has tended to focus on developments in
67
specific regimes, such as international trade or international humanitarian law.
It is time to expand this focus and examine how knowledge production results
from interactions among, as opposed to within, international legal regimes.
The WTO has been particularly active on this front. For example, in 2009
the WTO and UNEP jointly issued a report addressing linkages between trade
68
and climate change. Issued at a critical point in the ongoing negotiations over a
post-Kyoto climate change treaty, the report challenges the widespread belief
69
that trade rules are in tension with efforts to combat climate change. The
report discusses the WTO-compatibility of border taxes and emissions trading
systems, two controversial pricing mechanisms that can be used to control
70
71
greenhouse gas emissions. Like other joint studies on controversial topics, the
joint WTO–UNEP report does not purport to dispense policy advice. Rather, it
is explicitly intended to introduce new concepts and shift the debate over the
relationship between trade and climate change. In the report’s own words, its
“aim is to promote greater understanding of [the interaction between trade and
climate change policies] and to assist policymakers in this complex policy
72
area.”
Another conceptual interaction with potentially far-reaching consequences
is a joint WTO–OECD initiative that seeks to reconfigure how to measure, if
not understand, international trade. Trade statistics currently attribute the full
commercial value of a product to the country of export. Thus, as widely
73
reported, when a U.S. buyer imports an iPod from China at a cost of $144,
current statistical methods would increase the value of U.S. imports from China
by $144—even though much of the iPod’s value is licensed from U.S. firms and
74
the value-added operations in China total less than four dollars. Thus, current
statistical methods can generate misleading figures on trade balances and
66. Michael N. Barnett & Martha Finnemore, The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International
Organizations, 53 INT’L ORG. 699, 699 (1999).
67. See DAVID KENNEDY, THE DARK SIDE OF VIRTUE: REASSESSING INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIANISM (2004) (focusing on international humanitarian law); William J. Drake & Kalypso
Nicolaidis, Ideas, Interests and Institutionalization: “Trade in Services” and the Uruguay Round, 46
INT’L ORG. 37 (1992) (focusing on international trade).
68. See UNEP & WTO, Trade and Climate Change, at 47–66 (2009) [hereinafter Climate Report],
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/trade_climate_change_e.pdf.
69. See generally id.
70. Id. at 81 (discussing border taxes); id. at 91–95 (discussing emissions trading schemes).
71. See, e.g., WTO & ILO, Trade and Employment: Challenges for Policy Research (2007),
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/ilo_e.pdf (addressing globalization’s impact on employment
and wages).
72. Climate Report, supra note 68, at v.
73. Jason Dedrick et al., Who Profits from Innovation in Global Value Chains? A Study of the
iPod and Notebook PCs, SLOAN INDUSTRY STUDIES ANN. CONF. 16 (2008),
http://web.mit.edu/is08/pdf/Dedrick_Kraemer_Linden.pdf.
74. Id. at 31.
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thereby distort debates over trade policy. In response, the OECD and the WTO
are jointly developing new ways to more accurately measure trade flows. Again,
this initiative is not intended to produce new rules or regulations. Rather, it is
intended to “help policymakers, academics and the public at large better
75
understand trade in the 21st century,” in the belief that “better statistics today
76
will contribute to better policies tomorrow.”
The WTO–UNEP and WTO–OECD collaborations focus on relatively welldefined topics. Other conceptual interactions address more diffuse issues.
Consider, for example, the evolving relationship between climate change and
human rights. For nearly two decades, the climate debate has focused on the
nature, causes, and consequences of climate change. In recent years, however,
human rights bodies have initiated a series of conceptual interactions designed
to change the terms of climate discourse.
For example, in an address to the Bali Climate Conference in 2007, the UN
Deputy High Commissioner for Human Rights urged the use of a human rights
77
perspective when discussing climate issues. At roughly the same time, a diverse
range of international actors, including UNDP and the Organization of
American States (OAS), began to explore the interface between climate change
and human rights. In 2008, the Human Rights Council asked the Office of the
High Commissioner for Human Rights to prepare a “detailed analytical study
78
of the relationship between climate change and human rights.” In undertaking
the study, the Office of the High Commissioner opened up a dialogue with a
variety of other UN bodies, international organizations, national human rights
79
institutes, and nongovernmental organizations. The study, released in January
2009, concludes that climate change interferes with a wide range of human
rights and that states have an obligation under international human rights law
to protect those rights from the adverse effects of climate change, including in
80
particular through international cooperation.
The study triggered an extended dialogue on the relationships between the
two regimes. For example, in 2009 alone, the Special Rapporteur on adequate
housing issued a report on the impact of climate change on the right to

75. WTO, Annual Report 2013, 130 (2013), http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/anrep_e
/anrep13_e.pdf.
76. Pascal Lamy, Director-General, WTO, Address at the OECD: “New Steps in Measuring
Trade in Value Added” (Jan. 16, 2013) (transcript available at http://www.wto.org/
english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl261_e.htm).
77. Kyung-wha Kang, Deputy High Commissioner for Human Rights, UNHCR, Address to
Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and its
Kyoto Protocol: Climate Change and Human Rights (Dec. 3–14, 2007) (transcript available at
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=200&LangID=E).
78. HRC, Annual Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and the
Reports of the Office of the High Commissioner and the Secretary-General: Report of the Office of the
High Commissioner for Human Rights on the Relationship Between Climate Change and Human Rights,
10th Sess., ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/10/61 (Jan. 15, 2009).
79. See id. ¶ 2 (noting the comments and input from various organizations).
80. Id. ¶ 92–99.
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adequate housing, the Representative of the Secretary General on the human
rights of internally displaced people issued a report on the nexus between
climate change and internal displacement, and twenty Special Procedures
mandate holders issued a joint statement to encourage the inclusion of human
81
rights in the Copenhagen Climate Change Conference. More recently, the
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights appointed an
82
Independent Expert on Human Rights and the Environment.
The purpose of these initiatives is, in the words of a prominent human rights
83
advocate, to transform “how climate change is perceived.” To date, climate
change “has been viewed as a scientific projection, ‘a kind of line graph
stretching into the future with abstract measurements based on parts per
84
million, degrees centigrade or centimetres.’” But the introduction of “human
rights thinking” is intended to change this conceptualization by “supplying a set
of internationally agreed values around which policy responses can be
negotiated and motivated” and hence “contribute, qualitatively, to the
construction of better policy responses at both the national and international
85
level.” In short, actors in the human rights community have provoked an
ongoing set of conceptual interactions intended to change social understandings
of climate change, the problems it poses, and the range of appropriate
responses to it.
B. Nature of International Regulatory Interactions
In addition to distinguishing various forms of regulatory cooperation, it is
useful to categorize the nature of these interactions. For current purposes,
international regulatory interactions can be characterized as focused on the
“rationalization” of rules or operations, on the “expansion” of jurisdiction or
authority, or as involving political and legal “conflict” between two or more
bodies. Notably, interactions are quite fluid and these categories are highly
permeable; as any particular interaction proceeds, it may migrate from one
category to another.
1. Rationalization Interactions
As noted above, many operational interactions are triggered by the practical
reality that multiple international bodies often exercise concurrent jurisdiction
over the same set of individuals or activities and are designed to rationalize
these efforts. UNAIDS is a representative example. By the early 1990s, a
81. Joint Statement of the Special Procedure Mandate Holders of the Human Rights Council on the
UN Climate Change Conference (Dec. 7, 2009), http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/
DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=9667&LangID=E.
82. Human Rights Council Res. 19/10, Human Rights and the Environment, 19th Sess., U.N. Doc
A/HRC/RES/19/10, at 2–3 (Apr. 19, 2012).
83. Marc Limon, Human Rights and Climate Change: Constructing a Case for Political Action, 33
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 439, 451 (2009) (citation omitted).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 451–52.
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number of international organizations had developed AIDs programs. Donors
soon complained that a lack of coordination among UN agencies resulted in
duplicative efforts and turf battles, which lessened the effectiveness of the
86
global fight against AIDS. Thus, the original motivation behind UNAIDS was
the desire to streamline disparate yet overlapping efforts and to address policy
gaps. One notable accomplishment of UNAIDS was the development of a
detailed “division of labour” among the partner agencies.
Similar dynamics can be seen in the area of humanitarian aid. Due to the ad
hoc and unpredictable nature of emergencies, international responses were
traditionally highly disorganized. In 2005, the United Nations Emergency
Response Coordinator introduced an Agenda for Reform, which eventually led
87
to the formation of groups of organizations organized by “cluster.” The WFP,
the world’s largest humanitarian agency, is designated lead agency of the
“logistics cluster,” meaning it is responsible for coordination, information
management, and, when necessary, logistics service provision to ensure effective
88
and efficient operational logistics. In this role, the WFP is working with the
WHO, the IOM, and other international organizations in Syria and has
facilitated cargo operations on behalf of thirty-two different international
89
organizations in the Philippines in the aftermath of Typhoon Haiyan.
As this example suggests, relief operations frequently give rise to complex
cooperation issues. For example, the WFP has developed a complex set of
policies, guidelines, and standards for its emergency field operations, as have
90
other international organizations such as UNHCR, UNICEF, and the FAO.
When two or more of these organizations collaborate in joint activities, it
becomes necessary to address differences in rules and standards. Often, the
agencies do so through procedural approaches, such as identifying one agency
as the lead actor in a certain area. For example, when the WFP works with
91
UNHCR, UNHCR is generally responsible for distribution; in contrast, when
the WFP works with UNICEF, the WFP is generally responsible for
92
distribution. These agreed-upon divisions of labor are often memorialized in

86. LINDSAY
KNIGHT,
UNAIDS:
THE
FIRST
TEN
YEARS
20
(2008),
http://data.unaids.org/pub/report/2008/jc1579_first_10_years_en.pdf.
87. See Cluster Coordination, UN OFFICE FOR THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN
AFFAIRS, http://www.unocha.org/what-we-do/coordination-tools/cluster-coordination (last visited Mar.
10, 2015); About the Logistics Cluster, LOGISTICS CLUSTER, http://www.logcluster.org/logistics-cluster
(last visited Mar. 10, 2015).
88. Our Work, WFP, http://www.wfp.org/logistics (last visited Mar. 10, 2015).
89. See WFP, The Year after the Storm: The WFP Haiyan Report 24 (Nov. 2014),
http://fi.wfp.org/sites/default/files/fi/file/a_year_after_the_storm_-_the_wfp_haiyan_report.pdf;
see
generally
WFP
&
LOGISTICS
CLUSTER,
Syria
Response
May
2014
Report,
http://www.logcluster.org/sites/default/files/logistics_cluster_syria_monthly_report_may_140612.pdf .
90. See, e.g., WFP, EMERGENCY FIELD OPERATIONS POCKETBOOK (2002), http://www.unicef.org
/emerg/files/WFP_manual.pdf.
91. Id. at 243–44.
92. Id. at 248–49.
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93

agreements negotiated by the relevant secretariats.
Rationalization logics are also prominent in many regulatory interactions.
For example, both CITES and the FAO asserted authority to protect
endangered marine species. Numerous states expressed concern that, absent
coordination, the risk of inconsistent norms was unacceptably high, and many
FAO members asserted that the FAO should have a veto over CITES listing
decisions. Thereafter, officials from the two agencies negotiated an agreement
clarifying how responsibilities for deciding which species should be protected
94
would be divided between the two agencies.
Rationalization logics are found in conceptual interactions as well. For
example, the WTO–UNEP report on trade and climate devotes significant
attention to strengthening cooperation between “the trade and climate change
regimes . . . in a mutually supportive manner, within their respective spheres of
95
competence.” Notably, international bodies do not invariably seek to expand
their mandates. For example, in the trade–climate context, the WTO DirectorGeneral argued that the trade issues raised by efforts to combat climate change
96
were better addressed within the climate regime than by the WTO.
2. Expansion Interactions
Some interactions provide opportunities for international bodies to expand
their regulatory footprint. For example, the POPs–WHO interactions provide
public health officials direct and ongoing influence in the chemicals regime.
Given the structure of the POPs Convention, decisions made by the WHO, on
the basis of international public health norms, will lead to changes in an
environmental treaty’s rules governing the use of dangerous chemicals.
Similar dynamics can be seen on the operational side. Consider ongoing
interactions between the United Nations Relief and World Agency (UNRWA)
and UNHCR. UNRWA was created to provide humanitarian relief to refugees
and displaced persons forced to flee the British Mandate for Palestine as a
97
result of the 1948 Arab–Israeli war. When founded, UNRWA’s geographic
ambit was limited to Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, the Gaza Strip, and the West
98
Bank. UNHCR’s geographic ambit is worldwide; however, its statute provides
its competence shall not extend to a person “[w]ho continues to receive from
99
other organs or agencies of the United Nations protection or assistance.”
93. See, e.g., UNHCR & WFP, Memorandum of Understanding between the Office of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the World Food Programme (WFP) (July 1,
2002), http://www.refworld.org/docid/3d357f502.html.
94. See FAO-CITES MOU, supra note 37.
95. Climate Report, supra note 68, at 83.
96. Pascal Lamy, Director-General, WTO, Speech at the Informal Trade Ministers’ Dialogue on
Climate Change: Doha Could Deliver Double-win for Environment and Trade (Dec. 9, 2007),
https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl83_e.htm.
97. G.A. Res. 302 (IV), ¶ 5–7, U.N. Doc. A/RES/302 (IV) (Dec. 8, 1949).
98. UNRWA & UNHCR, THE UNITED NATIONS AND PALESTINIAN REFUGEES, at 4 (2007)
[hereinafter PALESTINIAN REFUGEES], http://www.unrwa.org/userfiles/2010011791015.pdf.
99. Statute of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, G.A. Res. 428
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These provisions raise questions as to whether and when Palestinian refugees
100
fall within UNHCR’s mandate.
Despite apparent textual limitations, over time, UNRWA and UNHCR
have increasingly collaborated in ways that push the boundaries of their
respective mandates. Examples include joint activities after Libya expelled
Palestinians in 1995 and, more recently, in the aftermath of attacks on
Palestinians in Iraq, when UNRWA and UNHCR coordinated on the provision
101
of assistance. Moreover, in recent years, UNRWA and UNHCR have acted in
102
coordination to provide assistance to Palestinian refugees in Jordan and Syria.
Through these joint activities, UNRWA has acted in areas arguably outside its
geographic mandate, and UNHCR has been active on behalf of individuals who
arguably fall outside of its mandate. Although the various operational
interactions between UNRWA and UNHCR have historically had a strongly ad
hoc nature, in 2010, the two organizations established a joint expert working
103
group to address issues related to the overlapping legal regimes in this area.
Finally, conceptual interactions often lead international actors into areas
traditionally considered outside their ambit. The efforts by the UN High
Commissioner for Human Rights to engage with officials from the climate
regime is one prominent example of an international actor moving into areas
not traditionally considered near the core of his expertise. A more recent
example is a joint study prepared by the World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO), the WTO, and the WHO on “Promoting Access to
Medical Technologies: Intersections between Public Health, Intellectual
104
Property and Trade.” Like other conceptual interactions discussed above, it
does not prescribe how to address particular public health problems, but rather,
it examines how to tailor systems to encourage innovation and ensure
sustainable and equitable access to innovations. Notably, the focus on
innovation, accessibility, and trade pulls each of the three partners outside of its
core areas of expertise.
3. Conflictual Interactions
Not surprisingly, interactions among international bodies are not always
cooperative. By way of example, consider recent efforts to address
shipbreaking. This practice poses a number of environmental risks. It is heavily
regulated in developed states, but regulation is substantially less stringent in

(V), Annex, ¶ 7, pt. c (Dec. 14, 1950).
100. UNHCR, Revised Note on the Applicability of Article 1D of the 1951 Convention relating to the
Status of Refugees to Palestinian Refugees, (Oct. 2009), http://www.refworld.org/docid/4add77d42.html .
101. Noura Erakat, Palestinian Refugees and the Syrian Uprising: Filling the Protection Gap during
Secondary Forced Displacement, 26 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 581(2014).
102. PALESTINIAN REFUGEES, supra note 98, at 12.
103. Erakat, supra note 101, at 595.
104. WHO, WIPO & WTO, Promoting Access to Medical Technologies and Innovation:
Intersections between Public Health, Intellectual Property and Trade (2012), http://www.wto.org/
english/res_e/booksp_e/pamtiwhowipowtoweb13_e.pdf.

DUNOFF_FINAL_1-14 (DO NOT DELETE)

290

1/14/2016 1:25 PM

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 78:267

105

many developing states. A number of international legal instruments—all
adopted within months of each other—address this activity, including IMO
106
Guidelines on Ship Recycling; ILO Guidelines on Safety and Health in
107
Shipbreaking; and Technical Guidelines for the Environmentally Sound
Management of the Full and Partial Dismantling of Ships, adopted by the
108
Conference of Parties to the Basel Convention. This highly fragmented
approach quickly raised concerns over regulatory gaps, overlaps, and potential
inconsistencies. Therefore, the IMO, ILO, and Basel Secretariats formed a joint
109
working group to study the relationship among the various instruments. The
three bodies agreed to collaborate on the drafting of a new treaty to be
concluded under IMO auspices.
Thereafter, the three organizations—along with other key actors, including
major shipping states like Norway—became deeply involved in negotiating and
drafting what eventually became the Hong Kong International Convention for
110
the Safe and Environmentally Sound Recycling of Ships. The Hong Kong
Convention, adopted in 2009, clearly shows the results of interagency
cooperation; it expressly incorporates principles set forth in instruments
prepared by the three institutions, and its annex creates a process of continuing
interactions among the three agencies in the promulgation of regulations under
111
the treaty. Although the treaty has not yet entered into force, the ILO and

105. See generally Tony George Puthucherril, From Shipbreaking to Sustainable Ship Recycling:
Evolution of a Legal Regime, in 5 LEGAL ASPECTS OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, 26–51 (David
Freestone ed., 2010) (detailing the differences in shipbreaking regulations in developed nations as
compared to developing nations).
106. IMO, Assemb. Res. A.962(23), A 23/Res.962 (Mar. 4, 2004) (amended by IMO, Assemb. Res.
A.980(24), A 24/Res.980 (Feb. 3, 2006)).
107. ILO, Safety and Health in Shipbreaking: Guidelines for Asian Countries and Turkey,
MESHS/2003/1 (Oct. 7–14, 2003).
108. Conference of Parties to the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements
of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal, Decision VI/24 (2012) (adopting the Technical Guidelines for
the Environmentally Sound Management of the Full and Partial Dismantling of Ships).
109. See Joint ILO–IMO–BC Working Group on Ship Scrapping, 1st Sess., Feb. 15–17, 2005, Report
of the First Session of the Joint Working Group on Ship Scrapping, at ¶ 3.8, Doc. ILO/IMO/BC WG 1/8
(Feb. 18, 2005) (acknowledging the conflict between the IMO Guidelines and the Basel Convention
guidelines).
110. Specifically, representatives of the IMO, Basel Convention, and ILO participated in three joint
meetings between 2005 and 2008 of the Working Group on Ship Scrapping. Joint ILO/IMO/BC
Working Group on Ship Scrapping, Report of the Working Group, 1st Sess., Feb. 15–17, 2005,
ILO/IMO/BC WG 1/8 (Feb. 18, 2005); Joint ILO/IMO/BC Working Group on Ship Scrapping, Report
of the Joint Working Group, 2nd Sess., Dec. 12–14, 2005, ILO/IMO/BC WG 2/11 (Dec. 14, 2005); Joint
ILO/IMO/BC Working Group on Ship Scrapping, Final Report, 3rd Sess., Oct. 29–31, 2008,
ILO/IMO/BC WG 3/6 (Oct. 31, 2008). Resolution 2 adopted at the conclusion of the 2009 International
Conference for the Safe and Environmentally Sound Recycling of Ships acknowledged the contribution
of the ILO and the Basel Convention to the development of the Convention. See Recycling of Ships:
The Development of the Hong Kong Convention, IMO, http://www.imo.org/ourwork/environment
/shiprecycling (last visited Mar. 10, 2015).
111. IMO, International Conference on the Safe and Environmentally Sound Recycling of Ships,
IMO Doc. SR/CONF/45 (May 19, 2009) (not in force) (opened for signature Sept. 1, 2009).
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Basel Secretariats have been involved in the development of draft regulations
under the treaty.
The Hong Kong Convention, however, has also given rise to controversy. In
particular, critics claim it is weaker than the Basel Convention in several
112
respects. Against this backdrop, the Basel Convention parties formally
examined whether the Hong Kong Convention provides “an equivalent level of
113
control and enforcement as that established under the Basel Convention.” An
Open Ended Working Group provided an assessment to the Conference of the
114
Parties, which debated the issue at an October 2011 meeting. The discussion
revealed a sharp split among Basel parties and, despite extensive dialogue,
consensus could not be reached. The Conference of the Parties adopted a
115
decision explicitly noting this ongoing disagreement. The decision also
encouraged states to ratify the Hong Kong Convention, suggesting equivalence,
but at the same time acknowledged that the Basel Convention Secretariat
should continue to assist countries in applying the Basel Convention as it relates
116
to ships, suggesting a lack of equivalence. The unresolved debate over
whether the Hong Kong Convention supports or undermines the Basel
Convention has likely contributed to the very low number of ratifications—
117
currently, three.
In another example, after a high-profile oil spill off the Spanish coast, a
number of nongovernmental organizations lobbied the UN Secretary General
to organize a process to discuss improving implementation of maritime safety
standards. In response, in 2003 the Secretary General convened a Consultative
Group on Flag State Implementation, including officials from the IMO, the
118
ILO, the FAO, UNEP, UNCTAD, and the OECD. Substantial differences of
112. Critics note that the Basel Convention covers a broader range of ships and recycling facilities,
and also that the Basel Convention’s technical guidelines rejects “beaching” as a dismantlement
method, whereas the dismantlement question is open under the Hong Kong Convention—at least until
the IMO adopts guidelines. For an analysis of these, and other differences, see Communication from
the European Commission to the Council, COM (2010) 88 final (Dec. 3, 2010).
113. UNEP, Report of the Conference of the Parties to the Basel Convention on the Control of
Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal on its Ninth Meeting, June 23–27,
2008, at Dec. IX/30, pt. I, UNUNEP/CHW.9/39 (June 27, 2008).
114. UNEP, Open-ended Working Group of the Basel Convention on the Control of
Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal, Cooperation between the Basel
Convention and the International Maritime Organization, UNEP/CHW/OEWG/7/12 (Apr. 14, 2010).
115. Conference of the Parties to the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary
Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, Cartagena, Columbia, Oct. 17–21, 2011, Report
of the Conference of the Parties to the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements
of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal on its Tenth Meeting, UNEP/CHW.10/28, at para. 130–35
(Nov. 1, 2011).
116. Id. at Annex I, BC-10/17, para. 2–3. The decision also underscored the importance of
continued cooperation between the ILO, IMO, and the Basel Convention on the issue of ship recycling.
Id. at para. 129.
117. IMO, Status of Multilateral Conventions and Instruments in Respect of Which the
International Maritime Organization or its Secretary-General Performs Depositary or Other Functions
509 (Mar. 10, 2015).
118. See G.A. Res. 57/141, ¶ 73, U.N. Doc. A/RES/57/141 (Feb. 21, 2003) (requesting the Secretary-
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opinion quickly emerged. The IMO observed that, with respect to flag state
implementation of safety and antipollution standards, “[t]he role of the IMO in
119
this regard should be seen as pre-eminent.” In a letter to the UN Secretary
General, the IMO’s Secretary General tartly observed that issues related to
state compliance with “IMO Conventions and regulations are not subjects
which need additional coordination at inter-agency meetings,” and that the
“IMO does not see the need for any further meetings of the inter-agency
120
Consultative Group.”
Operational interactions can likewise be conflictual. As noted above, the
impetus for various UNAIDs partners to work together came from donor states
and not from the agencies themselves. The different international agencies,
however, had very different ideas of how best to address the AIDS epidemic;
early efforts to collaborate sparked intense debates about how to prioritize and
121
allocate resources.
C. The Multi-dimensional Nature of International Regulatory Cooperation
For those unfamiliar with the interactions described above, the highly
compressed descriptions might seem a blur of acronyms. To summarize this
material graphically, the two axes discussed above are juxtaposed to create a
three-by-three matrix in table 1 below. The matrix provides a synoptic overview
of different modes of international regulatory cooperation between and among
international organizations. At the same time, it highlights the multidimensional
nature of contemporary international regulatory cooperation.

General provide a report “on the implementation of the present resolution”); U.N. Secretary-General,
Oceans and the Law of the Sea, at para. 85–91, U.N. Doc. A/58/65 (Mar. 3, 2003) (discussing “[f]lag
state implementation and enforcement”).
119. U.N. Secretary-General, Oceans and the Law of the Sea, ¶ 12,U.N. Doc. A/59/63 (Mar. 5,
2004).
120. Id. at Annex III.
121. See, e.g., TANA JOHNSON, ORGANIZATIONAL PROGENY: WHY GOVERNMENTS ARE LOSING
CONTROL OVER THE PROLIFERATING STRUCTURES OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE (2014).
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Table 1
Regulatory

Operational

UNAIDS
“Logistics Cluster” in
humanitarian
assistance
Collaborative
Partnership on Forests

Rationalization
IOMC–GHS
IMO–ILO
ICAO–ITU
FAO–CITES
Expansion

Conflictual

ILO–IMO guidelines
on liability and
compensation (fills
legal void)
CITES–WCO
POPs–WHO
ILO–IMO–Basel
(Hong Kong
Convention)
WTO–CITES–
UNCLOS–FAO talks
on fisheries
subsidies
Montreal Protocol–
WCO (sometimes)

Conceptual

WTO–UNEP report

CITES–WCO
ICCWC
UNRWA–UNHCR

OHCHR–United
Nations Framework
Convention on
Climate Change
(UNFCCC)
WTO–WIPO–WHO

UNAIDS (early years)
UN–IMO -Flag State
Implementation

Climate and human
rights (sometimes)

IV
AN AGENDA FOR FUTURE RESEARCH ON INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY
COOPERATION
Regulatory cooperation involving actors from different international
organizations and regimes occurs across a wide variety of issue areas and
operates across the full spectrum of lawmaking, implementation, and
enforcement. A primary goal of this article is to provide analytic tools to clarify
systematically the different modes of interaction leading to regulatory
cooperation. This analysis, however, immediately raises challenging questions
regarding the empirical determinants and the normative implications of this
activity. Although a thorough analysis of these issues is well beyond the scope
of this article, it is useful to identify topics that future scholarship might address,
including a number of empirical and descriptive research projects that would
substantially advance our understanding of the factors that drive interactions
among international organizations. In addition, this section identifies normative
concerns raised by international regulatory cooperation, including issues of
accountability, legitimacy, and power. Both individually and together, these
lines of inquiry suggest the outlines of a research agenda intended to
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regulatory

A. Positive Inquiry into International Regulatory Cooperation
The typology set out in part III highlights variation in the form and purpose
of international regulatory cooperation. This variation invites inquiry into the
factors driving or shaping the interactions among international bodies, including
relevant actors, the nature of the underlying cooperation problem structure,
substantive issue areas, and change over time.
1. Who Are the Relevant Actors?
The examples set out above demonstrate that interactions occur among
actors found in a range of issue areas. It would be useful to investigate how
structural relationships between the relevant actors shape interactions. For
example, are there systematic differences in regulatory outcomes depending on
whether the interacting entities (1) are located within “nested regimes,” such as
actors from the WTO and a regional trade body; (2) are from “parallel
regimes,” such as actors from two of the international financial institutions; or
(3) are from “unrelated regimes,” such as actors from an international trade
body and an international labor body? Another line of inquiry might explore
whether an increase in the number of relevant actors makes cooperation more
difficult, as more interests need to be satisfied, or easier, as the set of mutually
beneficial tradeoffs expands.
2. Problem Structure
The examples in part III reveal that international regulatory efforts address
a wide variety of international problems including coordination, cooperation,
distribution, and enforcement problems. Just as problem structure helps explain
122
the design and functioning of individual international organizations, problem
structure might help explain the nature and form of interactions among
international organizations. For example, do distributional problems more
frequently lead to conflictual interactions than enforcement problems? Do
coordination problems lend themselves more easily to operational interactions,
because parties have little reason to defect?
3. Issue Area
The international system is marked by uneven legalization and
institutionalization across issue areas. For example, regulatory regimes in the
economic realm are more numerous and more legalized than they are in the
security realm. And in the economic domain, both institutionalization and
legalization are much higher in the area of trade than in finance. The highly
variable distribution of international regulatory bodies suggests that efforts at
122. Barbara Koremenos et al., The Rational Design of International Institutions, 55 INT’L ORG. 761
(2001).
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international regulatory cooperation will be both more common and more
frequently successful in some issue areas than in others, and identifying these
patterns would enhance our understanding of both the possibilities and limits of
regulatory cooperation.
4. Sequencing and Change over Time
The survey in part III emphasizes that interactions are often fluid and
dynamic. Thus, the interactions among the ILO, IMO, and Basel Secretariats
concerning the Hong Kong Convention shifted over time from cooperative to
123
conflictual;
the interactions among the six international organizations
involved in the creation of UNAIDS evolved from cooperative to conflictual to
124
cooperative; and the regulatory interactions between UNEP and the WCO
125
have vacillated between cooperative and conflictual. The variation over time
invites inquiry into why some interactions are relatively stable while others
migrate along either of the axes identified in part III. The variation also invites
inquiry into the features that push interactions towards or away from
cooperative outcomes.
B. Normative Analysis of International Regulatory Cooperation
A complementary set of inquiries could examine the normative implications
of international regulatory cooperation. Specifically, future research could
explore whether the normative critiques lodged against traditional forms of
international lawmaking are equally applicable to international regulatory
cooperation. For example, some critics note that international processes are
insufficiently transparent, increasingly detached from popular or representative
126
politics, and are no longer sufficiently rooted in state consent. Others claim
that international law systematically privileges the interests of powerful states
and well-organized political actors and gives lesser regard to more weakly
127
organized and less powerful groups and vulnerable individuals. These and
related critiques lead to frequent claims that much international law is
unaccountable and illegitimate. These critiques arguably apply with greater
force to the phenomena of international bodies and secretariats initiating
international regulatory interactions and also developing new international
norms, often without explicit state consent.
For current purposes, a few lines of argument can be outlined and several
research inquiries identified. First, many of the interactions outlined above are
designed to permit international organizations to achieve their objectives more
123. See supra, Part III.B.3.
124. See supra, Part III A.1.c. & Part III.B.1.
125. See supra, Part III.A.2.
126. For analyses of the various critiques of international law, see, e.g., JACK L. GOLDSMITH &
ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005); JENS DAVID OHLIN, THE ASSAULT
ON INTERNATIONAL LAW (2015); STEVEN WHEATLEY, THE DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2010).
127. Stewart, supra note 20, at 211.
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effectively. For example, when the WTO collaborates with other organizations
to help poorer states participate more fully in the international trade system,
these efforts are intended to promote the WTO’s trade liberalization objectives.
Those who object to these objectives would likely find the WTO’s interactions
with other bodies similarly problematic. In cases like this, positions on the
normative desirability of regulatory cooperation will be derivative of normative
positions regarding the goals of the underlying legal regimes, raising issues well
beyond the scope of this symposium.
More importantly, whether interactions among different international
organizations reduce or enhance international law’s supposed deficiencies and
whether they entrench, or challenge, powerful actors and interests should be
treated as open questions that require analysis rather than assertions. Consider,
for example, the IMO–ILO interactions producing norms on the safety of
seafarers. Prior to these interactions, the IMO had long been active on maritime
safety issues. IMO instruments, were traditionally “not [driven by] concern for
the lives of sailors, slaves, or emigrants, but concern for the security of maritime
128
investment.” Shifting from an IMO to a joint IMO–ILO process might
plausibly be viewed as adding an institutional voice that represents a previously
underrepresented set of interests directly impacted by global maritime safety
norms. Claims along these lines, in turn, invite inquiry into whether the
interactive process between the IMO and ILO is more or less subject to
“capture” than IMO processes—as well as inquiry into whether entities that
represent other arguably relevant interests, such as environmental or human
rights bodies, adequately participated in these regulatory interactions. For
current purposes, the point is not to resolve whether the IMO–ILO interactions
were sufficiently inclusive, but rather to suggest that normative evaluation of
international regulatory cooperation should proceed on the basis of highly
detailed accounts of specific interactions, accounts that have not yet been
developed.
Thus, international regulatory cooperation offers a rich research agenda to
those troubled by international law’s supposed legitimacy and accountability
deficits. Here, the discussion is limited to a few conceptual points and
possibilities regarding these issues. When two international bodies collaborate
on issues of mutual concern, their interactions effectively reaffirm the stature
and legitimacy of each agency to operate in the area under consideration. Thus,
joint IMO–ILO efforts on maritime safety reinforce claims that this issue
comfortably falls within each body’s jurisdiction.
Other times, interactions can challenge or undermine the legitimacy of
claims to authority in particular domains. For example, unsuccessful efforts to
collaborate, or exclusion of a particular body from an international partnership,
can signal substantial concerns over whether the agency is a legitimate
participant in a particular policy domain. Hence, the IMO’s sharp rejection of

128. JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRAHOS, GLOBAL BUSINESS REGULATION 436 (2000).
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efforts to create a multiagency consortium to discuss flag-state implementation
of maritime safety standards can be seen as a challenge to the legitimacy of
other organizations’ involvement in these issues. This interaction can be
usefully contrasted with the conflictual interactions related to the Hong Kong
Convention. In that case, the Basel Secretariat’s concern over the treaty’s
environmental stringency did not reflect concerns over the legitimacy of IMO
and ILO participation in this policy area, but rather over the substantive merits
of competing policy approaches.
To be sure, those who critique international organizations’ lack of
accountability might suggest that regulation via interactions between two or
more of these bodies simply compounds the problem. But this claim would need
to address some salient features of regulatory interactions among international
organizations. For example, virtually every exchange among two or more
international bodies de facto calls for a reasoned elaboration for or against a
proposed action, with each body reviewing the positions and activities of the
other. Thus, for example, structured dialogues between the WHO and the POPs
Secretariat over whether and how to regulate dangerous chemicals, between the
FAO and CITES over whether an appropriate scientific basis exists to list a
marine species as endangered, and between the ICAO and the ITU over how
best to protect air navigation systems can be seen as introducing requirements
of reasoned decisionmaking and review mechanisms in areas where they might
otherwise be lacking.
Finally, future research can do much to illuminate the power dynamics that
motivate efforts at international regulatory cooperation and shape their
outcomes. Do international organizations led by powerful states or economic
interests dominate or crowd out “weaker” international bodies? Do regulatory
interactions operate to give voice to those typically marginalized by
international processes, and if so, under what conditions? There is likely no
“global” answer to these questions—international regulatory efforts come in
too many varieties and in too many different contexts to permit broad
generalizations. But a few observations might help inform future inquiries in
these areas.
One observation is that “stronger” international organizations do not
invariably use interactions to expand their jurisdiction or to impose their views
on “weaker” organizations. For example, as noted above, a joint report by the
WTO and UNEP defended the use of certain trade instruments to address
climate change and the WTO deferred to the climate regime on technology
129
transfer issues. So the relevant question is whether interactions like these
serve to entrench asymmetries or create avenues for change.
Perhaps more importantly, studying international regulatory cooperation
can serve as a reminder that power in international affairs comes in many

129. See supra Part III.A.3.
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varieties. To be sure, international regulatory efforts provide ample examples
of “power as influence”—in which more powerful international bodies, or
bodies dominated by more powerful actors, are able to influence the timing and
content of regulatory outcomes. But other forms of power are on display in
international regulatory interactions as well. For example, some unsuccessful
efforts at international regulatory cooperation illustrate what one might call
131
“power as autonomy,” which is the ability to exercise policy independence
free of the pressures or constraints imposed by other international actors. The
IMO’s rejection of collaboration with other international bodies,
notwithstanding efforts by the UN Secretary General and others to forge a
collaborative partnership, is but one example of how power as autonomy
manifests in the context of international regulatory efforts. Moreover,
international regulatory efforts often involve “discursive power,” that is, “the
social processes and the systems of knowledge through which meaning is
132
produced, fixed, lived, experienced, and transformed.”
Conceptual
interactions, such as the interactions between the human rights and climate
change communities, are the most prominent examples of the working of
discursive power, as they are centrally concerned with the contestation and
production of social meaning. But the iterative dialogic interactions that mark
other forms of regulatory interaction—such as the exchanges between UNEP
and the WCO over ozone-depleting substances and between the ICAO and the
ITU over aircraft communication systems—can likewise be approached as
opportunities to study the workings of discursive power.
In short, co-governance by actors from different international regimes gives
rise to new sites of power, where the issue is less the autonomy of any particular
international organization than it is the various forms of cooperative and
uncooperative relationships that emerge from ongoing interactions between
officials from different regimes. Thus, too sharp a focus on whether “weaker”
regimes gain or lose from regulatory cooperation risks valorizing one form of
power while ignoring others that are more fluid, contingent, and contested.
As should be clear, although international regulatory cooperation holds
much promise, there is no reason to think that every instance of institutional
interaction is necessarily benign, or that the pathologies that mark some
international governance disappear through interaction. One goal of future
research should be to identify the factors that lead to interactions that reduce,
rather than strengthen, deficiencies in international lawmaking. Future inquiries
can explore when interactions favor well-organized interests that have the
resources and expertise to participate effectively in inter-institutional

130. See generally POWER IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE (Michael Barnett & Raymond Duvall eds.,
2005).
131. This phrase comes from Benjamin J. Cohen, The Macrofoundations of Monetary Power, in
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY POWER 31, 32 (David M. Andrews ed., 2006).
132. Michael Barnett & Raymond Duvall, Power in International Politics, 59 INT’L. ORG. 39, 55
(2005).
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interactions and when they empower those left out of traditional processes.
Future scholarship can explore questions such as under what circumstances do
interactions permit international organizations to pursue their own institutional
agendas and when do such interactions promote advancement of broader public
interests? When will interactions expand the domain of international politics
and contestation—and when will they offer technocratic expertise in their
place? These questions are hardly exhaustive. But they do suggest that there is
fertile ground for future research, both theoretical and empirical, on
international regulatory cooperation.
V
CONCLUSION
The central goals of this article are to illustrate a largely hidden landscape of
international regulatory cooperation, to raise issues for further analysis and
development, and thereby to demonstrate the value of sustained study of this
activity. The survey presented above reveals that the terrain of international
regulatory cooperation is highly variegated, yet it consists of a dense network of
collaboration increasingly important to the management of contemporary
international affairs. Understanding the nature and quality of these
relationships is essential to understanding the range and the reach—the
possibilities and the limits—of modern international regulatory cooperation.

